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WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
meaningful beliefs which prompt the registrant's objection to all wars
need not be confined in either source or content to traditional or paro-
chial concepts of religion, the test has become unworkable.21 The pres-
ent effect is clearly not what the framers of the Universal Military Train-
ing and Service Act envisioned.
PETER M. DESLER
Evidence-DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE-THE RIGHT OF CONFRONTA-
TION. Robertson v. Commonwealtb, 211 Va. 62, 175 S.E.2d 260 (1970).
The defendant was found guilty of the rape of two girls, ages nine
and eleven. His conviction was based on the testimony of the girls and
the results of laboratory tests performed on vaginal specimens taken
from the victims. A copy of the laboratory report was admitted into
evidence under the authority of section 19.1-45 of the Virginia Code.'
The defendant on appeal contended that the admission of the lab-
oratory report into evidence violated his constitutional right to cross-
examination of witnesses,2 but the Supreme Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia affirmed the conviction.3 The court construed the Code section
as permitting investigation reports by the Chief Medical Examiner,
which were not related to post-mortem examinations, to be prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein, and held that the Chief Medical
21. So unmanageable has this determination become that the Welsh court stated
that if petitioner classifies his beliefs as "religious" this is to be given "great weight,"
while if he characterizes his views as not religious "this is a highly unreliable guide
for those charged with administering the exemption." 90 S. Ct. at 1797.
1. VA. CoDE ANN. § 19.1-45 (Repl. Vol. 1960):
Reports and Records Received As Evidence.-Reports of investigations
made by the Chief Medical Examiner or his assistants or by medical
examiners, and the records and reports of autopsies made under the
authority of this chapter, shall be received as evidence in any court or
other proceeding, and copies of records, photographs, laboratory findings,
and records in the office of the Chief Medical Examiner or any medical
examiner . . . shall be received as evidence in any court or other pro-
ceeding for any purpose for which the original could be received without
any proof of the official character or the person whose name is signed
thereto.
2. U.S. CONsr. amend VI; VA. CONST. art. I, § 8. The Sixth Amendment right of
confrontation derives from the English common-law right which developed as a
reaction against the use of affidavits in the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh. Note,
Confrontation, Cross-Examination, and the Right To Prepare A Defense, 56 GEO. LJ.
Rv. 939, 957 n.136 (1968).
3. Robertson v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 62, 175 S.E.2d 260 (1970).
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Examiner was not required to appear as a witness in support of the
laboratory reports.4
The Board of Health in Virginia is required to establish and maintain
suitable laboratories for the examination of clinical material submitted
by members of the medical profession in the state.5 The Board is au-
thorized to furnish the police and other law enforcement officers or
agencies with all assistance, cooperation, and facilities which can be
afforded by its laboratory and technical staff.0 These statutes provide
the necessary basis for the participation of the state laboratory in a crim-
inal case.
The Virginia Code contains several sections concerning the admis-
sibility of evidence developed by laboratory or scientific tests. For ex-
ample, the certificate of any chemist employed by the Board of Health,
attesting to the results of analyses made on mixtures believed to be alco-
holic in composition, when signed and sworn to by the chemist, is
evidence in all prosecutions and all controversies in any judicial proceed-
ing.7 The statute does not violate the constitutional right of confronta-
tion.8 When a statute authorizes the admission into evidence of a cer-
tificate made by a public officer concerning acts that are within the
scope of his duty, such certificate is admissible under the documentary
evidence exception to the hearsay ruleY It is well settled that the Sixth
Amendment is not intended to exclude proper documentary evidence. 10
In prosecutions for exceeding automobile speed limits, the court may
receive as evidence the results of a speedometer calibration test." The
constitutionality of this evidentiary rule in respect to the defendant's
4. id. The court overrules Brooks v. Hufman, 200 Va. 488, 106 S.E.2d 631 (1959)
to the extent that it is inconsistent. Brooks had followed the authority of Russell v.
Hammond, 200 Va. 600, 106 S.E.2d 626 (1959) in holding the certificate of a blood
analysis in a case involving driving under the influence of intoxicants inadmissible
in a civil action under VA. CODE ANNt. § 18-75.2 (1950), now § 18.1-55.1 (Supp. 1970),
and in a one sentence statement unsupported by reasons, the court held the certificate
inadmissible under VA. CODE Am. § 19-26 (1950), now § 19.1-45 (Repl. Vol. 1960).
5. VA. CODE ANN. § 32-17 (Repl. Vol. 1969).
6. VA. CODE ANNt. § 52-11.1 (Repl. Vol. 1967).
7. VA. CODE ANNl. § 4-90 (Repl. Vol. 1966).
8. Hosier v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 516, 115 SE. 511 (1923); Bracey v. Com-
monwealth, 119 Va. 867, 89 S.E. 144 (1916).
9. Bracey v. Commonwealth, 119 Va. 867, 89 S.E. 144 (1916); 7 MIann's JUR. OF
VIRGNIA AND WEST VIRGINIA, EvIDENcE 5 86 (1949).
10. Cochran v. Commonwealth, 122 Va. 801, 94 S.E. 329 (1917); Bracey v. Common-
wealth, 119 Va. 867, 89 S.E. 144 (1916); Runde v. Commonwealth, 108 Va. 873,
61 S.E. 792 (1908).
11. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-193.1 (Repl. Vol. 1967).
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right of confrontation has been expressly upheld by the Supreme Court
of Appeals of Virginia. 2 A similar rule has evolved as to the use of
chemical analyses as evidence to determine the amount of alcoholic
content in a person's blood in cases of intoxication." Under a statute
which became effective January 1, 1971, a breath analysis may also be
used to determine intoxication; but it is not admissible into evidence since
it is merely a preliminary analysis of alcoholic content. 14 The Bogen's
test, utilized in Virginia to determine alcoholic content in blood, has
been held to come under the category of observed physical condition,
and not of opinion, and is therefore admissible as documentary evi-
dence.' 5
Likewise, under Virginia's Drug Control Act,', the certificate of a
chemist stating his analysis of substances believed to be narcotic is admis-
sible as evidence in prosecution for misdemeanors and preliminary hear-
ings for felonies. The same section further provides that if either party
to the action desires the chemist to appear for cross-examination, a mo-
tion to this effect must be made within a reasonable time prior to the
12. Royals v. Commonwealth, 198 Va. 876, 96 S.E.2d 812 (1958); Dooley v. Com-
monwealth, 198 Va. 32, 92 S.E.2d 348 (1956).
13. VA. CODE AtNN. § 18.1-55.1 (Supp. 1970). This section is a consolidation of
sections 18.1-55 through 18.1-57 (Repl. Vol. 1960), which resulted from the court
holding that the sections must be read together. Russell v. Hammond, 200 Va. 600,
106 S.E.2d 626 (1959). Because there is little substantive change in the sections, case
law on the repealed sections is still valid.
In Wade v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 117, 116 S.E.2d 99 (1960), the Supreme Court
of Appeals refused to admit into evidence the results of a blood analysis made
under VA. CODE AN. § 18-75.2 (1950), now § 18.1-55.1 (Supp. 1970), where the
defendant was charged with involuntary manslaughter and not drunk driving.
14. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-54.1 (Supp. 1970).
15. Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 1958); Kissinger v. Funkhouser, 194
F. Supp. 276, 279 (E.D. Va. 1961); see Comment, Use of Blood Tests As Evidence of
Intoxication in Virginia, 18 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 370 (1961); Federal Asshnilative
Crime Act: How Much State Law?, 16 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 62 (1959).
Blood tests have been held admissible in the federal courts under the business
records exception to the hearsay rule. Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476 (4th Cir.
1958), interpreting the Federal Shop Book Rule, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1732 (1966). The
operations of government constitute "business" within the meaning of this statute.
LaPorte v. United States, 300'F.2d 878, 880 (9th Cir. 1962).
16. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-524.77 (Supp. 1970).
In any prosecution for a misdemeanor or in any preliminary hearing for
a felony under this chapter, the certificate of analysis of the chemist per-
forming such analysis for the Commonwealth) when duly attested by the
chemist, shall be admissible in evidence as evidence of the facts therein
stated and the results of the analysis -referred to therein.
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day of trial.'7 The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia in Ritter v.
Commonwealth,8 however, has held that a copy of the report of the
Chief Medical Examiner as to the analysis of the contents of a package
is admissible as evidence under section 19.1-45 of the Code, the same
section employed in Robertson. The court stated that if the defendant
had desired an opportunity to question the Medical Examiner as to his
findings, he could have summoned him as a witness; otherwise, an analy-
sis made by an official in the regular course of his duties is presumed to
have been properly made.1 9
Among the common tests utilized in identification of a seminal fluid
is the Walker or Kaye test for acid phosphatese which was used in the
Robertson case. It is the most accepted and conclusive test,20 but is
relatively complex for one who has not developed considerable familiar-
ity with forensic chemistry.' Blood tests, also highly technical pro-
cedures requiring a high degree of skill on the part of the analyst,22 are
presently admissible into evidence as reliable proof. 3 Such tests, while
complex, are admitted into evidence without accompanying expert testi-
mony upon the realization that certain laboratory procedures are so
standardized that the possibility of error is nearly non-existent.
It is evident, then, that the Court of Appeals in Robertson has merely
brought the admissibility of laboratory reports on the results of vaginal
swabs in rape cases into line with the procedures recognized in similar
areas of the law. The court accomplishes this by expanding the applica-
tion of section 19.1-45 of the Code beyond post-mortem examinations.
Justification for this development is found in other sections of the Code
as well as in Ritter v. Comizonwealth.24 Although criticism may arise
because of the complexity of the test involved, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has stated that receipt of a certificate
17. Id.
18. 210 Va. 732, 173 S.E.2d 799 (1970).
19. Id.; accord, Brush v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 312, 136 S.E.2d 864 (1964).
20. 12 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FActs, Identification of Seminal Fluids, § 10, at 320 (1962).
21. Id. See also Smith, Scientific Proof and Relations of Law and Medicine, 29 VA. L.
REv. 679, 710 (1943).
Under VA. CODE ANw. § 19.1-34 (Repl. Vol. 1960), the Chief Medical Examiner is
required to be a skilled pathologist and eligible to be licensed as a doctor of medicine,
while one need only be a licensed doctor of medicine to be a medical examiner under
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-40 (Repl. Vol. 1960).
22. Annot., 159 A.L.R. 212 (1945).
23. Ladd & Gibson, THe Medico-Legal Aspects of the Blood Test To Determine
Intoxication, 24 IowA L. REv. 191, 192 (1939).
24. 210 Va. 732, 173 S.E.2d 799 (1970).
1970]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
into evidence does not foreclose inquiry into the procedure and accuracy
of the chemical analysis.as The Robertson ruling appears to be based on
the court's trust in the reliability of the state laboratory system, and its
knowledge that the defendant, if he so desires, may require the chemist
to appear as a witness.
FRANcis H. FRYE
Landlord and Tenant-RETALATORY EVICTIONS. Dickhut v. Nor-
ton, 45 Wis. 2d 389, 173 N.W.2d 297 (1970).
Elmer Dickhut, a landlord, brought an unlawful detainer action pur-
suant to a Wisconsin statute,' seeking a writ of restitution for the prem-
ises against Clifford Norton, a month-to-month tenant. The defendant
admitted that a timely thirty day eviction notice had been served,2 and
that he had failed to quit the premises on or before the eviction day.
3
Prior to the eviction notice, the tenant had filed a complaint with the
Milwaukee City Health Department reporting the unsanitary conditions
of the premises.4 He denied that he was holding over without right,
25. Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476, 481 (4th Cir. 1958).
1. Under the law of Wisconsin, applicable proceedings to remove a tenant holding
over without right are governed by Wis. STAT. ANN. § 291.01 (1) (1958). Commence-
ment of the action, supplementary proceedings, and pleadings are codified in Wis.
STAT. ANN. §§ 291.05, 291.07 (1958). The plaintiff-respondent fully complied with the
requisite statutory proceedings.
2. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 234.03 (1958) embodies the notice requirement in terminating
tenancies. It provides in pertinent part as follows:
Whenever there is a tendancy at will or by sufferance, created in any
manner, the same may be terminated by giving at least 30 days' notice in
writing to the tenant requiring him to remove from the demised premises,
or by the tenant's giving at least 30 days' notice in writing that he shall
remove from said premises, and by surrendering to the landlord the
possession thereof within the time limited in such notice ...
Under a month-to-month tenancy, the notice of thirty days by the landlord must
terminate at the end of the rent month and not before. Hartnip v. Fields, 247 Wis. 473,
19 N.W.2d 878, 879 (1945). In Dickhut, the plaintiff-landlord gave the written statutory
notice on May 27, 1968. The notice required the tenant to quit the premises on or
before June 30, 1968. Consequently, the notice given was timely, pursuant to the
applicable statute.
3. Dickhut v. Norton, 173 N.W.2d 297, 298 (1970).
4. Id. The tenant's allegation that the conditions of the premises were in fact unsani-
tary was corroborated at the trial by an inspector of the Milwaukee Health Depart-
ment.
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